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More Money More Problems: Examining the Impact of
the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020 on Banks and
Regulators
I. INTRODUCTION
When examining the crime of money laundering, banks play a
crucial role in reporting suspicious activity and placing institutional
safeguards against it.1 The act of money laundering, representing funds
obtained through criminal activity as derived from a legitimate source, is
one that finances criminal organizations, narcoterrorism, and even human
trafficking.2 In the wake of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”) files leak of September 2020, it is evident that the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has not vigorously pursued money
laundering prosecutions and has arranged sweetheart deals in the rare
instances the DOJ has prosecuted banks, leading to minimal arrests.3 As
a result, many bankers have little to fear if investigative journalists or
regulators discover them handling exorbitant amounts of laundered drug
cartel money.4 Although new legislation has been enacted–the Anti1. See Jason Leopold et al., The FinCEN Files, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 20, 2020, 1:01
PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/fincen-files-financial-scandalcriminal-networks [https://perma.cc/4HSQ-5D4M] (assessing the “hollowness of banking
safeguards” in the wake of the FinCEN files leak and labelling Suspicious Activity Reports
filed by banks as “vital for law enforcement investigations”).
2. Id.; see also James Chen, Money Laundering, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moneylaundering.asp
[https://perma.cc/HQZ3DNFV] (describing what money laundering is and how it works).
3. Leopold, supra note 1; see also Jack Kelly, Explosive Exposé Alleges Banks Aid
Drug Kingpins, Criminals And Terrorists: Here’s How This Could Be Stopped Right Now,
FORBES
(Sept.
21,
2020,
3:44
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2020/09/21/explosive-expos-alleges-banks-aid-drugkingpins-criminals-and-terrorists-heres-how-this-could-be-stopped-rightnow/?sh=6f0cbcde6b3f [https://perma.cc/J84M-DNGY] (criticizing the issues with an honor
system of banks filing Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) with the Department of the
Treasury (USDT) and one of its divisions, FinCEN, and how they serve as an initial alert for
law enforcement).
4. See Spencer Woodman, HSBC Moved Vast Sums Of Dirty Money After Paying
Record Laundering Fine, INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://www.icij.org/investigations/fincen-files/hsbc-moved-vast-sums-of-dirty-moneyafter-paying-record-laundering-fine/ [https://perma.cc/7G65-4ERN] (reporting on continued
money laundering violations by HSBC during a probationary period for a deferred-agreement
prosecution which did not indict HSBC or any bank executives involved in helping funnel
$881 million belonging to the Mexican Sinaloa Cartel and other Mexican gangs throughout
their worldwide branches).
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Money Laundering Act of 2020 (“AML Act”)–there is still a blatant
disconnect between statutory language and enforcement mechanisms.5
For example, HSBC Bank (“HSBC”) faced scrutiny after
admitting to helping funnel $881 million of unlawfully obtained money
controlled by the violent Sinaloa Cartel and other Mexican drug cartels.6
A criminal prosecution could have resulted in HSBC being barred from
operating in the United States.7 Despite internal recommendations to
criminally prosecute HSBC, U.S. DOJ officials elected to enter into a
deferred-prosecution agreement (“DPA”), citing the maintenance of
financial stability as the predominant priority.8 In a DPA for civil
enforcement, the government agrees not to bring charges against the
defendant in return for the defendant’s agreement to certain requirements
or conditions.9 In the case of corporate defendants, these agreements
avoid the collateral consequences of innocent employees losing their
jobs, permit victims to be repaid through victim compensation funds, and
allow the offending corporation to restore its image.10 Still, a preference
for DPAs may lead to individual offenders amassing a perception of
being untouchable and fearless of any federal investigations they may
face in the wake of any allegations of money laundering.11
5. See infra Part IV (discussing the HSBC scandal the full extent of the misconduct
alleged against them across multiple departments); but see Carl A. Fornaris, The Anti-Money
Laundering Act Of 2020: Congress Enacts The Most Sweeping AML Legislation Since
Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 19, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/anti-money-laundering-act-2020-congress-enactsmost-sweeping-aml-legislation-passage [https://perma.cc/U6NH-KZH4] (detailing how the
AML Act increases civil penalties and attempts to modernize the AML and combat the
financing of terrorism systems by expanding regulation to include the antiques market and
cryptocurrency channels).
6. See Jill Treanor & Dominic Rushe, HSBC Pays Record $1.9bn Fine to Settle US
Money-Laundering Accusations, GUARDIAN (Dec. 11, 2012, 12:47 PM)
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/dec/11/hsbc-bank-us-money-laundering
[https://perma.cc/U4A8-YZ8V] (examining the details behind HSBC’s deferred prosecution
agreement with American authorities).
7. See Woodman, supra note 4 (detailing how HSBC officials faced up to criminal 175
criminal charges before the Deferred Prosecution Agreement conditionally dismissed these
charges).
8. Mica Rosenberg, Top U.S. Officials Rejected Push to Prosecute HSBC - Lawmakers'
Report, REUTERS (July 11, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-hsbcmoneylaundering-idUKKCN0ZR249 [https://perma.cc/77GV-BLJM].
9. See What’s a Deferred Prosecution Agreement?, MOLOLAMKEN,
https://www.mololamken.com/knowledge-Whats-a-Deferred-Prosecution-Agreement
[https://perma.cc/Z8N7-9VPK](last visited Jan. 20, 2022) (defining DPA and explaining why
they may be preferable to use against corporation defendants).
10. Id.
11. See infra Part IV (describing the downfall of Arthur Anderson and the collateral
consequences of criminally charging Enron after the discovery of widespread fraud).
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If these emboldened bankers faced potential imprisonment or the
delicensing of their banks, they would prioritize the authenticity of the
accounts they managed over the desire to facilitate massive transactions
from illegal entities. Congress should enact legislation that enforces
stricter penalties on banks that are complicit with the flow of illicit funds
and impose “silver bracelets” on criminally liable bankers who have acted
with blatant disregard of the AML laws.12
Money laundering is a white-collar crime13 for which there has
been a steep drop in criminal prosecutions.14 White-collar crime is a
subset of crime that is financial in nature and is characterized by fraud
and concealment, not the threat of physical force or violence.15
According to Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, there was a 53.5% decrease in white-collar prosecutions
from 2011 to 2021.16 Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”), the principal enforcing agency of white-collar crime, has
increasingly shifted its resources towards combatting terrorism and now
prosecutes less than half the cases it was handling in 2001.17
This Note will delve into present issues facing anti-money
laundering enforcement in five distinct parts. Part II clarifies the context
in which money laundering arises, describes Congressional attempts to
regulate it, and the authority Congress has delegated to regulate money
laundering.18 Part III discusses the criticisms of Congress for its limited
regulation and punitive measures to defend the integrity of the American
financial marketplace.19 Part IV examines the challenges faced in
regulating money laundering, particularly in the rapidly developing

12. See Kelly, supra note 3 (quoting former senior U.S. Justice Department lawyer
Paul Pelletier in stating that “bankers will never learn until you start putting ‘silver bracelets’
(handcuffs) on people”).
13.
See
White-Collar
Crime,
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/white-collar-crime [https://perma.cc/AMK3-4S4J] (last
visited Jan. 20, 2022) [hereinafter White-Collar Crime] (defining money laundering and the
role of the FBI in combatting it).
14. See White-Collar Crime Prosecutions for 2021 Continue Long Term Decline,
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/655/
[https://perma.cc/Y5NM-DVQR] (last visited Jan. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Prosecutions]
(illustrating the decrease from 10,162 prosecutions in 2011 to the estimate of 3,545 reported
in 2021).
15. White-Collar Crime, supra note 13.
16. Prosecutions, supra note 14.
17. Id.
18. Infra Part II.
19. Infra Part III.
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virtual financial industry, and how banks can address those challenges.20
Finally, Part V offers suggestions to deter money laundering and provide
more effective Congressional regulation of the financial marketplace.21
II. BACKGROUND
Federal law defines money laundering as “the movement of illicit cash or
cash equivalent proceeds into, out of, or through the United States, or
into, out of, or through United States financial institutions.”22 Cash
equivalents are highly liquid investments, usually with a maturity of three
months or less.23 The fundamental purpose of moving the criminally
obtained cash through financial institutions is to make these “dirty” funds
look “clean” and legitimate.24 There are three steps in money laundering:
(1) the initial placement of funds, (2) layering the funds to obscure the
path of the dirty money, and finally, (3) the integration of those funds
back into the economy disguised as clean money.25 With regard to banks’
roles in money laundering, these financial institutions serve as an integral
vehicle in which the illegal proceeds, whether obtained through
corruption or criminal enterprises, are “laundered” through.26 To
understand the issues in combatting money laundering, one must
understand how it works and the various forms.
A.

Three Steps of Money Laundering

20. Infra Part IV.
21. Infra Part V.
22. In addition, the “illicit cash or cash equivalent proceeds” refers to the money
obtained through criminal activity. 31 U.S.C. § 5340(2)(A).
23. Alicia Tuovila, Cash and Cash Equivalents (CCE), INVESTOPEDIA (June 14, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cashandcashequivalents.asp
[https://perma.cc/G7VW-8ZUP].
24. Money is dirty when it is derived from illegal activity and conversely, clean money
is obtained from lawful activity; money laundering essentially attempts to make the origins
of dirty money appear clean. Chen, supra note 2.
25. All You Need to Know About the Three Stages of Money Laundering,
TAXPROFESSIONALS.COM, https://www.taxprofessionals.com/california/santa-clara/news/allyou-need-to-know-about-the-three-stages-of-money-laundering-197
[https://perma.cc/7NRS-9FDA] (last visited Sept. 18, 2021) [hereinafter Three Stages].
26. See Robert Barrington, Are Banks Enablers Or Victims Of Financial Crime?, INT'L
BANKER (Dec. 15, 2020) https://internationalbanker.com/banking/are-banks-enablers-orvictims-of-financial-crime/ (arguing that “[b]anks are a key part of the money-laundering
chain, and to that extent, are undoubtedly facilitators and enablers”).
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The first step of money laundering—the placement of the dirty
money—often involves selecting a financial institution to place the illicit
funds through initially.27 Financial institutions need to be wary of
complications that arise when customers have strong connections to
individual bankers because where an organization or individual directing
a money laundering operation has an intimate relationship with the
banker, this could lead to an apparent failure of due diligence at best and
bank complicity at worst.28
One such area of banking where these individualized
relationships are prevalent is in private banking, which is “the personal
or discreet offering of a wide variety of financial services and products to
the affluent market, and these operations typically offer all-inclusive
personalized services.”29 Usually, private banks have a steep minimum
balance requirement to open an account, ranging from $250,000 to $1
million.30 Private banking accounts get personalized attention, catering
to that specific client’s needs, whether for wire transfers, depositing
checks, or even connecting the customer with financial specialists in
other fields such as a trust and estate advisor.31
One particular financial instrument susceptible to fraud is the
money order, as it is less bulky than cash, replaceable if lost, and may be
purchased anonymously.32 For example, Mexican criminal organizations
typically ship money orders purchased in American metropolitan hubs
such as El Paso, Miami, and New York City to Mexico and other Latin
American countries where money order regulations are more relaxed and
not documented as comprehensively as they are within the U.S.33 Under
current federal reporting requirements, any “deposit, withdrawal,
exchange of currency or other payment or transfer” in currency of
$10,000 or above must be reported in the form of a Currency Transaction

27. Three Stages, supra note 25.
28. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. MONEY LAUNDERING THREAT ASSESSMENT 1, 3
(2005), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/246/mlta.pdf [https://perma.cc/YF4X-HG77]
[hereinafter ASSESSMENT] (describing that “money laundering through private banking
relationships more often involves a gross failure of due diligence, if not bank complicity”).
29. Id. at 3.
30. See Matthew Goldberg, Private Banking: Here’s How It Works, BANKRATE (Oct.
8,
2020)
https://www.bankrate.com/banking/what-is-private-banking/
[https://perma.cc/EB3K-XYKT] (providing a general analysis on the benefits and drawbacks
to private banking).
31. Id.
32. ASSESSMENT, supra note 28 at 17.
33. Id.
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Report (“CTR”).34 A CTR is part of a bank’s AML responsibilities and
may also be filed if a customer is “deliberately avoiding the $10,000
threshold,” an act referred to as “structuring.”35
Furthermore, although most people working in compliance jobs
fully comply with reporting standards of filing Suspicious Activity
Reports (“SARs”), the minority that does not, sometimes working for
these private banking firms, gives bad actors a head start in laundering
illicit funds.36 SARs filings are “intended to alert the appropriate
authorities that the transaction in question should be reviewed and
investigated, in addition to their own internal compliance review
efforts.”37 Dirty money may be “blended” with clean funds in an attempt
to disguise the dirty money, potentially through transactions for a front
company posing as a legitimate business.38
The second step is the “layering” of the dirty funds to complicate
any detection efforts by law enforcement to discover the dirty money.39
Layering may occur through either physical or monetary transactions.40
In physical transactions, one would purchase physical assets, such as cars
or artwork, with the dirty money and later resell those assets or convert
the money into monetary instruments.41 The focus on this activity is
increasing the level of complexity of the laundering activity and making
the paper trail harder to track.
Casinos are notoriously susceptible to layering, primarily through
criminals exchanging cash obtained illegally for casino chips which are
then cashed out and misrepresented as gambling winnings.42 Structuring,
the act of using multiple deposits below a reporting threshold to go
undetected, has been utilized for gambling winnings fraud as well.43 In
one instance, several individuals purchased chips below a reporting
34. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.311 (2011).
35. Adam Hayes, Currency Transaction Report, INVESTOPEDIA (July 29, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/ctr.asp [https://perma.cc/RXT8-M7DE].
36. See Kelly, supra note 3 (describing how SARs notify authorities of potential
wrongdoing).
37. See id. (explaining how financial institution conduct internal investigations in
addition to notifying enforcement agencies after the filing of a SAR).
38. See United States v. Weisberg, No. 08-CR-347, 2011 WL 4345100, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2011) (depicting a case where a defendant had allegedly mixed $1.6
million of “dirty” money in an account with $30 million of “clean” money).
39. Three Stages, supra note 25.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. ASSESSMENT, supra note 28 at 52.
43. Id.
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threshold over twelve months, ending with a single person cashing out
$1.1 million, requiring only one CTR being filed during the cash out.44
The third and final step is the integration of the funds that were laundered
back into the economy under the appearance of normal business
proceeds.45 Integration comes in many forms: it may involve money
laundering participants setting up accounts with foreign banks complicit
in money laundering, selling property purchased with laundered funds, or
lending dirty funds to their own front companies through the form of
fraudulent loans.46 Institutions with existing AML program requirements
include mutual funds, precious jewel dealing, and banks.47
B.

Money Laundering Legislation

In 1970, Congress passed the Banking Secrecy Act (“BSA”) to
combat money laundering by providing a new source of ample
information accessible by domestic and international law enforcement.48
The BSA imposes recordkeeping and reporting obligations pursuant to
uniform regulatory standards to deter the financing of terrorism, criminal
organizations, and tax evasion.49 One of these requirements is the
mandatory filing of a Form 8300 for the payment or receipt of a cash
transaction over $10,000.50 Another BSA requirement is the filing of a
Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts for any individual who
has a foreign bank account, mutual fund, or other foreign financial
accounts.51
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“PATRIOT Act”).52 This act
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., 251 F. Supp. 3d 684, 688689 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (showing a money laundering case with an element of proof involving
money laundering with a foreign bank).
47. ASSESSMENT, supra note 28 at 71-72.
48. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 31 U.S.C. § 5311; Bank Secrecy Act, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/banksecrecy-act [https://perma.cc/9P6A-GRYB] (last visited Jan. 20, 2022) (explaining the
purpose of the BSA).
49. 31 U.S.C. § 5311.
50. ASSESSMENT, supra note 28 at 69.
51. Id.
52. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (“PATRIOT Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 2001
U.S.C.C.A.N. (115 Stat.) 272 (2001); see also USA PATRIOT Act, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T
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required financial institutions to develop and implement AML programs
that financial institutions are required to follow.53 Additionally, the act
expanded the legislative reach of the BSA to include underground
banking institutions as financial institutions for anti-money laundering
purposes.54
Recently, in January of 2020, Congress passed the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2020.55 The AML Act requires institutions to file BSA
reports and records to deter money laundering, the financial support of
terrorist organizations, and protect the safety of the United States and its
financial systems.56 In a June 2020 statement, FinCEN clarified that
banks (as defined by the BSA) would not be required to comply with the
AML Act until its effective date, at the start of 2021.57
As part of a growing crackdown on international financial crimes,
the AML Act prohibits knowingly concealing a material fact concerning
ownership or the source of funds in a financial transaction if the person
is a foreign political figure or if any of these transactions are for over $1
million.58 In addition, federal examiners who review compliance are
ordered to attend training on risk factors, trends in financial crime, and
learn why fighting money laundering is necessary for law enforcement
and national security agencies.59
III. CRITICISMS OF CURRENT SYSTEM
Although the AML Act seemingly represents a massive overhaul of
Money Laundering regulation, it still has significant shortcomings. The
various programs and enhancements the act has codified will fail in
execution if the loopholes are too pervasive.60
NETWORK,
https://www.fincen.gov/resources/statutes-regulations/usa-patriot-act
[https://perma.cc/FF2N-DT7G] (last visited Jan. 22, 2022) (providing a general overview of
the PATRIOT Act).
53. 31 U.S.C. § 5352.
54. PATRIOT Act § 359.
55. Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-283, Div. F, 134 Stat 3388.
56. 31 U.S.C. § 5311.
57. Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Interagency Statement on the Issuance
of the Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism National Priorities,
(June
30,
2020),
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/Statement%20for%20Banks%20(June%20
30%2C%202021).pdf [https://perma.cc/QG7U-7SLH].
58. 31 U.S.C. § 5335.
59. 31 U.S.C. § 5334(a).
60. See Stephen M. Kohn, Congress Must Protect Anti-Money Laundering
Whistleblowers,
NAT’L
L.
REV (Jan.
26,
2021),
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Whistleblowers are essential to detecting money laundering as
their internal positions within institutions often provide them with
information about and access to transactions which might demonstrate
money laundering. These crimes depend on secrecy, and whistleblowers
are insiders who can discover these crimes and serve as primary witnesses
in these prosecutions.61 Although whistleblowing introduces robust
awards for whistleblowers, the AML Act’s overhaul to the existing SEC
whistleblower program removed the minimum reward amount while
simultaneously capping whistleblowers to 30 percent of all monetary
sanctions.62
By removing the minimum threshold of rewards
whistleblowers can recover, there will be a lack of uniformity and
consistency in recovery amounts and might not adequately compensate
whistleblowers for the importance of their contributions.63
Furthermore, although the act proposes whistleblower
protections from retaliatory actions such as firings, these protections are
unavailable to employees at Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) insured institutions, which could exempt protections to the
most significant sources of whistleblowers.64 The anti-retaliation law
passed in the new AML Act contains an explicit exemption for employees
at insured credit unions and FDIC-insured institutions.65 Since every
national and state bank is required by law to have FDIC coverage, 66 all

https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-must-protect-anti-money-launderingwhistleblowers [https://perma.cc/TYV2-RUJS] [hereinafter Whistleblowers] (“[t]he [AML
Act’s] numerous problems will result in a chilling effect on whistleblowers, especially when
otherwise fully valid whistleblowers who have lost their jobs and careers are denied rewards
due to loopholes in the law”).
61. See id. (explaining the role of whistleblowers as key witnesses in money laundering
enforcements and addressing Congress’ changes to whistleblower rewards and protections).
62. Id.
63. See id. (describing how language in the AML Act contains language that is
“identical” to the 1943 False Claims Act, one which did not work in practice due to
whistleblowers being disincentivized to file cases and led to the loss of billions of dollars).
64. See Stephen M. Kohn, Big Banks Get a Big Break on Pending Whistleblower Law,
THE HILL (Dec. 7, 2021, 8:30 AM) https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/528995big-banks-get-a-big-break-on-pending-whistleblower-law
[https://perma.cc/PJ3B-HCTL]
[hereinafter Big Break] (reporting on institutions that are FDIC insured being exempt in the
new whistleblower law within the 2021 NDAA).
65. See Whistleblowers, supra note 60 (explaining how “a ‘carve out’ contained in the
AML law excludes all employees at FDIC insured institutions and credit unions from these
protections”).
66. Lucas Downey, Insured Financial Institution, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 22, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insured-financial-institution.asp
[https://perma.cc/77LE-CEHJ] (describing how FDIC insurance works and what institutions
have it).
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bank employees for these banks are therefore unprotected from
retaliatory firings and are thus disincentivized to hold fraudsters
accountable.67
In addition to what is outlined in the AML Act, the United States
Department of the Treasury (“USDT”) may deny a meaningful reward to
any whistleblower.68 Under the Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), whistleblowers that
provided information that led to successful prosecutions received awards
from ten to thirty percent of the recovery.69 However, this minimum
reward amount has been removed, meaning the USDT has final authority
in setting a settlement reward as low as a penny for a sanction obtained
of any size.70
Another hurdle for whistleblowers is the absence of rewards for
criminal cases, as those sanctions are under the “victims’ compensation”
and thus are outside of the realm of whistleblower law.71 Civil
enforcements and criminal enforcements both require whistleblowers for
effective prosecutions, so excluding whistleblower rewards to criminal
prosecutions will only make these types of enforcements harder, leading
to a lack of success in practical execution of criminal enforcement.
Additionally, the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”)
poses a secondary challenge to successfully implementing the AML Act.
As of September 9, 2021, the MSPB has not voted on a single
whistleblower case since 2017 due to the lack of a quorum.72 The
connection to money laundering prevention becomes apparent when the
purpose of the MSPB is disclosed; they are tasked with hearing federal
employee appeals, including retaliatory firings.73 So what happens when
there’s been over a four-year gap in any activity for an appellate board?74

67. See Big Break, supra note 64 (criticizing how “[n]o other modern whistleblower
law denies a majority of potential whistleblowers the ability to protect themselves from
retaliation. . . ”).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Whistleblowers, supra note 60.
72. Id.; see generally Nicole Ogrysko, Lack of Quorum Hits 3-year Mark at MSPB,
with No Clear End in Sight, FED. NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 24, 2020),
https://federalnewsnetwork.com/workforce/2020/01/lack-of-quorum-hits-3-year-mark-atmspb-with-no-clear-end-in-sight/ [https://perma.cc/VHR5-QRX3] (illustrating the lack of
activity in the MSPB and the issues with its inaction).
73. Ogrysko, supra note 72.
74. Big Break, supra note 64.
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The cases pile up; as of December 2019, 2,529 pending appeals were
awaiting a decision.75
IV. CHALLENGES IN REGULATING MONEY LAUNDERING AND
MITIGATING ITS RISK
Policing money laundering is far different from regulating other
crimes and is described by the FBI as a “massive and evolving challenge
that requires collaboration on every level.”76 As evidenced by the DoddFrank Act, anti-money laundering efforts depend on whistleblowers to
enforce the AML Act.77
A.

Enforcement Challenges for United States Attorneys

Securing a criminal conviction for money laundering requires a
jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of each element.78 To
conceptualize the daunting task a U.S. attorney faces in convicting
defendants accused of money laundering, this Note will explore the
appellant brief of United States v. Gudipati, an August 2021 Fifth Circuit
case which upheld the convictions of five defendants for four different
forms of money laundering.79 In Gudipati, six people were convicted of
a complex, “two-year multi-million dollar black market peso exchange
money-laundering scheme” where money from illicit American drug
sales were laundered through businesses in Laredo, Texas, before being
returned to Mexican drug dealers.80 The scheme concealed the source of
proceeds by making them appear as legitimate transactions when the drug
dealing organization was actually using dollars from illicit drug sales and
75. Ogrysko, supra note 72.
76. White-Collar Crime, supra note 13.
77. See Whistleblowers, supra note 60 (“Since Dodd-Frank became law,
whistleblowing under the Commodity Exchange Act exploded, uncovering billions in corrupt
oil trading violations, price fixing, foreign exchange manipulation, and other frauds impacting
numerous consumer products”).
78. United States v. Gudipati, No. 19-40524, 2021 WL 3744908 1, 2 (5th Cir. Aug.
24, 2021).
79. Id. at 1.
80. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Six Convicted for Roles in Multi-Million
Dollar Black Market Peso Exchange Money-Laundering Scheme (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/six-convicted-roles-multi-million-dollar-black-market-pesoexchange-money-laundering-scheme [https://perma.cc/UE8B-4UDS] (describing how
various Laredo stores, specifically “the owners of El Reino International . . . accepted loose
bulk-cash” after being told of its drug dealing origins and subsequently neglected filing
federally mandated Form 8300s which are required after receiving over $10,000 in cash).
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selling them to a Mexican importer, functioning as a “drug broker,” in
return for pesos.81
In proving that a conspiracy to commit money laundering existed,
the government had to prove “(1) that there was an agreement between
two or more persons to commit money laundering and (2) that the
defendant joined the agreement knowing its purpose and with the intent
to further the illegal purpose.”82 These elements outline two significant
issues with prosecuting money laundering; a prosecutor must prove that
the defendant joined the conspiracy knowing that the purpose was to
commit money laundering and had the specific intent to further that
organization’s nefarious objectives.83 So logically, if a requisite element
of a successful prosecution is a need for a specific intent, a successful
defense can be raised by proving that the burden has not been met through
an absence of specific intent or that insufficient evidence was brought
forth in its prosecution.84
Obtaining a guilty verdict for concealment of money laundering
requires the government to prove that the financial transactions “had the
purpose, not merely the effect, of ‘making it more difficult for the
government to trace and demonstrate the nature of the funds.’”85 This
element carves out an additional defense, allowing defendants to claim
that their financial transactions were not primarily intended to make it
harder for the government to track and find the purpose of the funds.
Additionally, for “avoidance money laundering,” the government must
prove “that the defendant was aware of certain reporting requirements
and knew the transaction was designed to avoid those requirements.”86
This charge may be successfully defended by the defendant claiming that
they did not intentionally avoid reporting requirements, providing an
additional hurdle of proving the purpose of the transactions.87
81. Gudipati, 2021 WL 3744908, at *1.
82. Id. at *2.
83.
See
Money
Laundering
Basics,
GOLDMAN
&
ASSOCS.,
https://www.criminallawyer-chicago.com/money-laundering-basics.html
[https://perma.cc/WX7Z-G2F2] (last visited Sept. 19, 2021) (explaining money laundering
background and defenses).
84. Id.
85. Gudipati, 2021 WL 3744908, at *2 (quoting United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684,
690 (5th Cir. 2013)).
86. Id.
87. See id., (stating that to prove avoidance money laundering, “the government must
prove that the defendant was aware of certain reporting requirements and knew the transaction
was designed to avoid those requirements”) (quoting United States v. Bronzino, 598 F.3d 276,
281 (6th Cir. 2010)).
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Finally, for a jury to find the defendant guilty of “substantive
money laundering,” the government must prove that the defendant
“actually conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction with
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity with knowledge that its purpose
was to conceal the source of the proceeds or avoid transaction reporting
requirements.”88 Again, the burden of a money laundering prosecution
relies on the government proving its case by proving the defendant
performed or attempted to perform a transaction with unlawful proceeds
under the guise of not triggering reporting requirements, such as
compelling the financial institution to file a SAR.89
Throughout each of these statutory crimes, the difficulty in proving
that a defendant, who may not even testify, committed all these specific
intent crimes makes it even more necessary that whistleblowers testify
and provide insight into the crimes that may have taken place.90 Although
this is not a comprehensive list of money laundering crimes, each of these
instructions requires a specific intent, essentially requiring the jury to
have some level of insight into the reasons the defendant acted the way
they did.91
The aggregate number of white-collar criminal cases prosecuted has
sharply trended downwards since 2011.92 The total amount of
prosecutions has steadily decreased since 2001 besides a short period of
growth between 2006-2011.93 However, some observers believe this
drop is related to which party resides in the Oval Office. Professor
Brandon Garrett of Duke Law theorized that this drop has a political
correlation to President Trump’s election, stating that “[i]f you look at the
past 18 to 20 months, there is no comparison to the Obama years.”94
Garrett further suggests that the decrease in arrests is an enforcement
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Whistleblowers, supra note 60 (asserting that “[m]oney laundering needs
secrecy to succeed . . . [and] whistleblowers are perfectly situated to detect these crimes and
provide the key evidence for successful prosecution”).
91. Gudipati, 2021 WL 3744908, at *2.
92. See Stephen Gandel, White-Collar Crime Prosecutions Hit Lowest Level in 33
Years, CBS NEWS (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/white-collar-crimeprosecutions-have-hit-lowest-level-in-33-years/ [https://perma.cc/489H-A5PD] (reporting on
the decreasing level of White-Collar Arrests, decreasing from 10,162 prosecutions in 2011 to
5,425 in 2019).
93. White-Collar Crime, supra note 13.
94. See Gandel, supra note 92 (quoting Duke University Law Professor Brandon
Garrett who believes the drop in prosecutions and lowering in fines against corporations is a
partisan issue and correlated with President Donald Trump’s election).
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issue when remarking “there may be some serious corporate crime going
on that is just not being punished.”95
However, this change in white-collar prosecutions may actually
stem from an earlier incident, the 2002 prosecution of Arthur Anderson
LLP (“Arthur Anderson”), in the aftermath of the Enron scandal.96 As a
corporation convicted of obstruction of justice, Arthur Andersen lost its
accounting license and went out of business, putting tens of thousands of
employees out of work.97 The case had “collateral consequences” on
employees, shareholders, and others incidentally related to Arthur
Andersen.98 ProPublica reporter Jesse Eisinger described that the
collapse of the accounting firm “ushered in an era of prosecutorial
timidity . . . . [Arthur] Andersen had to die so that all other big
corporations might live.”99
Another contributing factor to declining white-collar prosecutions
is bank consolidation.100 While acknowledging a series of mergers and
deregulation within the banking industry, former Attorney General Eric
Holder admitted that indictments against major consolidated banks, many
of which are publicly traded, would “have a negative impact on the
national economy, perhaps even the world economy.”101
For instance, when HSBC was being investigated in 2012 for
money laundering, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer urged U.S.
authorities not to criminally indict HSBC, warning of “very serious
implications for financial and economic stability.”102 Shortly after that
statement, HSBC entered into a DPA arranged by the DOJ, agreeing to
pay a $1.9 billion fine, submit to five-year probationary period, and
accept blame for a “blatant failure” to implement anti-money laundering
controls. 103 This mistake is evidenced in part by the bank severely
understaffing the compliance office within Mexico which allowed
95. Id.
96. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Corrupt Bankers Avoid Jail, NEW YORKER (July
24, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/07/31/why-corrupt-bankers-avoidjail [https://perma.cc/ANU7-TFNV] (describing how Arthur Anderson’s demise after its
conviction led to federal prosecutors becoming more tentative to initiate white-collar criminal
prosecutions).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See id. (describing bank consolidation’s effect on white-collar crime
prosecutions).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Treanor & Rushe, supra note 6.

2022]

ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING

103

pervasive amounts of money laundering to occur.104 Former Attorney
General Assistant Lanny Breuer described how Mexican drug traffickers
would deposit hundreds of thousands of dollars every day in HSBC
accounts and that the total amount of money laundered was $881 million
between 2006 and 2010.105 Even while on probation from their DPA,
HSBC continued to provide services to shell companies, alleged
criminals, and drug cartels.106 Ultimately, the criminal immunity of those
working for HSBC may have emboldened the banking corporation to
continue functioning in the same irresponsible manner that initially
landed the London incorporated bank holding company in trouble.107
B.

How Financial Institutions Can Mitigate Risks

Banks and other financial institutions have a fiduciary duty to their
consumers to ensure the integrity of the financial marketplace and report
the discovery of suspicious activity within their transactions.108
Regulations are getting more immersive, so staying up to date will boost
a financial institution’s reputation and avoid invasive investigations from
regulatory agencies or any subsequent sanctions.109
One example of these regulations is Know Your Client (“KYC”),
“a set of standards used within the investment and financial services
industry to verify customers, their risk profiles, and financial profile.”110
Enacted as part of the PATRIOT Act, the statutory basis for KYC dictates
that the “Secretary of the Treasury shall prescribe regulations setting forth
the minimum standards for financial institutions and their customers
regarding the identity of the customer that shall apply in connection with
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Woodman, supra note 4.
107. See Leopold, supra note 1 (describing how “banks such as JPMorgan Chase,
HSBC, Standard Chartered, Deutsche Bank, and Bank of New York Mellon continued to
move money for suspected criminals [after being fined or prosecuted for misconduct]”).
108. See Leopold, supra note 1 (stating that “banks must file suspicious activity reports
when they spot transactions that bear the hallmarks of money laundering or other financial
misconduct . . . ”).
109. See Jackie Wheeler, AML and Payments: Building a Successful Compliance
Program, PAYPERS (Sept. 1, 2021, 8:15 AM), https://thepaypers.com/thought-leaderinsights/aml-and-payments-building-a-successful-compliance-program--1251283
[https://perma.cc/W9QX-VELM] (explaining how banks can take effective compliance
measures).
110. James Chen, Know Your Client (KYC), INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 17, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/k/knowyourclient.asp [https://perma.cc/D8GN-DJ7G]
(describing what “Know Your Client” is and how it works).
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the opening of an account at a financial institution.”111 In addition,
FinCEN requires financial institutions to verify customers and beneficial
owners that possess a 25% or greater ownership, and this threshold is
lowered for higher risk entities that have additional security measures
imposed.112 Financial institutions must understand the type of account
and the purpose of the customer relationship to develop a risk profile that
is important when discovering suspicious activity.113 Documents that
satisfy KYC requirements are a birth certificate, driver’s license, or other
government-issued ID.114 Some jurisdictions require two forms of
identification, but all require a valid address and a document confirming
that address.115 Additionally, many cryptocurrency exchanges have
implemented KYC protocols to verify customers dealing in the
decentralized currencies.116
Employee training is also integral to deterring money laundering
and violations of the reporting requirements.117 Training should concern
the details of compliance regulations and educate employees that they are
essential in preventing the commission of money laundering and the
harmful effects of failing to file SARs and suspicious transactions to
supervisors.118 Furthermore, hiring a compliance officer who can
effectively train employees in AML programs will assist in maintaining
compliance with federal requirements.119
When these requirements are overlooked or not appropriately
prioritized, massive fines may be levied against culpable financial
institutions.120 In the case of Citigroup, poor risk management, data
governance, and internal controls led to a $400 million civil penalty
assessed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) in

111. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l)(1).
112. Chen, supra note 110.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Wheeler, supra note 109.
118. Id.
119. Wheeler, supra note 109.
120. See Pete Schroeder, Citigroup Fined $400 Million By Regulators, Agrees to Fix
'Longstanding
Deficiencies',
REUTERS
(Oct.
7,
2020,
11:16
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-citigroup-enforcement/citigroup-fined-400-million-byregulators-agrees-to-fix-longstanding-deficiencies-idUSKBN26T0BL
[https://perma.cc/6FH7-7D3N] (detailing how Citigroup was fined $400 million for failing to
meet required compliance standards for a bank of their size).
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October 2020.121 According to the OCC’s consent order, “[Citigroup]
failed to implement and maintain an enterprise-wide risk management
and compliance risk management program, internal controls, or a data
governance program commensurate with the Bank’s size, complexity,
and risk profile.”122 Ultimately, clearer instructions and regular training
for financial institution employees can deter wrongdoing and help protect
financial institution executives from liability while also avoiding any
prosecutions or hefty fines from lapses in compliance.123
The elite and secluded space of private banking is particularly
vulnerable to money laundering.124 This industry promotes a “[c]ulture
of confidentiality [through] the use of secrecy jurisdictions or shell
companies.”125 Also, “lax internal controls” and “[p]rivate bankers
[acting] as client advocates” prejudice these bankers in favor of their
clients at the expense of promoting financial compliance.126
Furthermore, these banks facilitate the formation of “offshore entities”
for their clients.127 Each of these conditions puts private bankers in a
nebulous position where they have the knowledge and ability to prevent
the nefarious usage of overseas entities and shell companies before it
occurs, but this would counter the ingrained culture of confidentiality and
facilitating deposits in overseas tax havens.128
To mitigate money laundering risks in private banking, these
banks can establish risk assessments that factor in the source of their
customers’ wealth, the anticipated activity of the account, purpose of the
121. See Press Release, Off. Comptroller Currency, OCC Assesses $400 Million Civil Money
Penalty Against Citibank, (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/newsreleases/2020/nr-occ-2020-132.html [https://perma.cc/6JU2-XKAY] (stating how the OCC
fined Citigroup $400 million due to unsound and unsafe business practices and its failure to
establish effective risk management and internal controls).
122. Id.
123. Schroeder, supra note 120.
124. See FED. FIN. INSTS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, Private Banking – Overview, BANK
SECRECY ACT/ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL 273, 274 (2015),
https://bsaaml.ffiec.gov/docs/manual/09_RisksAssociatedWithMoneyLaunderingAndTerror
istFinancing/20.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PDQ-JASK] (describing the private banking
industry’s particular susceptibility to money laundering).
125. Id at 274.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 273.
128. See Joris Luyendijk, Former Private Banker: ‘Making Money is the Easy Part,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
19,
2013)
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/19/private-banker-investment
[https://perma.cc/P895-V7WF] (depicting an anonymous account of private banking as one
inundated with “office politics,” hyper competitive coworkers, and clients with lots of money
[but not necessarily financial savviness]).
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account, public information about the customer that can be reasonably
obtained, and whether the geographic location of the account poses
greater risks and susceptibilities to money laundering.129 Customer due
diligence based on these factors can help combat money laundering as
well, allowing banks to “establish the identity of their private banking
clients and, as appropriate, the beneficial owners of accounts.”130
Learning a customer’s identity is particularly important in private
banking, as this will hold the owner responsible in the case of wrongdoing
and discourage any money laundering activity that may be easily traced
back to that accountholder by the private banker assigned to the culpable
account.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
For the AML Act to serve its desired purpose in combatting the
use of financial institutions as vehicles for criminal enterprises to access
their illicitly obtained funds, the loopholes prohibitive to combatting
money laundering need to be closed. The AML Act created two
loopholes by: (1) abolishing the minimum reward to whistleblowers and
(2) exempting employees at FDIC-insured institutions from retaliatory
discharge protection as a whistleblower. As long as both of these
loopholes persist, other meaningful changes in the AML Act will be
ineffective.
Whistleblowers are integral to the criminal prosecution of
orchestraters of complex and convoluted money laundering crimes.131 It
makes sense that financial rewards upon successful prosecutions can
provide sufficient motivation to testify. However, the absence of
protection from retaliatory firings for whistleblowers working for FDIC
insured institutions poses a major threat, as this includes bank workers.
Additionally, under the Dodd-Frank Act, whistleblowers were entitled to
between 10 and 30 percent of sanctions obtained.132 With that minimum
being removed and the 30 percent remaining in place,133 it means that
even when a whistleblower can provide exemplary testimony and help

129. Id. at 274-275.
130. Id. at 275.
131. See supra part III (describing the repercussions of the AML Act’s removal of
whistleblower protections).
132. Whistleblowers, supra note 60.
133. Id.
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obtain government sanctions, they are not legally entitled to any sort of
significant compensation.
Furthermore, the consolidation of multiple banks has discouraged
federal prosecutions against larger banks for fears of adverse economic
effects. It is not enough to testify that “banks are not too big to jail” while
simultaneously overruling the criminal charging of a bank accused of
widespread wrongdoing.134 This consolidation of power has placed
pressure on federal prosecutors to reach DPAs with large banks that
protect culpable executives from jail time, even if they failed to put in
place or comply with statutorily required compliance standards.
Essentially, prosecuting with stronger AML enforcement and
imposing jail time will assist in the combatting of money laundering
through United States financial institutions. However, it is not enough to
simply enact legislation that imposes harsher penalties, crimes, and
individual accountability on culpable banks and bankers. Prosecutors
should prioritize proceeding with criminal indictments without any fear
of economic repercussions associated with indicting employees of
consolidated banks.
In conclusion, if the worrying trend of the DOJ absolving banks
or mitigating their wrongdoings continues, banks will only continue to
act with impunity, which will in turn lead to the degradation of our
banking system. To restore the integrity of our financial system,
enforcement agencies and legislators need to address the issues of current
legislation and the execution of it. Money laundering in and of itself is
not a violent crime, but it is one that enables violent and ruthless
organizations while also harming innocent parties associated with the
wrongdoer(s). It is important that the DOJ treat this crime with the
appropriate severity warranted, and not to allow those complicit and
enabling its commission to avoid facing the consequences of their
actions.
SAMUEL J. RIER*

134. See Rosenberg, supra note 8 (discussing how former U.S. Attorney General Eric
Holder and other senior Justice Department leadership declined to criminally charge HSBC
and how Holder has testified before congress that “banks are not too big to jail).
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